Thereafter, Father Marilley instructed Schwab to reject any attempts to withdraw funds from the account and rejected his daughters entreaties to release money to her for educational and living purposes.

What about Plaintiff Schwab, which withheld funds properly owing to Daughter Marilley for years? Judge Earp discharged it of any liability with regard to the funds it restrained.

Judge Houston’s Opinion in Moore v. Brooks, 2026 NCBC 6, raises questions of personal jurisdiction and the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

That odd pairing of legal concepts stems from Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Brooks for actions taken in connection with Brooks’ position as the Chief Investment and Financial Officer of an out-of-state LLC, Winthrop Intelligence, LLC.

The plaintiff was suing on behalf of the estate of Drue A. Moore. Moore, a founder of the Winthrop LLC, had been accused by Defendant Brooks of taking millions of dollars of unauthorized distributions from Winthrop over several years. Op. ¶14.

Brooks embarked on a campaign to force Drue to convey substantial assets (including his personal residence in North Carolina, a brokerage account holding approximately $1 million, and multiple “luxury wristwatches”) to Brooks, Winthrop LLC, and others.

Brooks demanded these assets to force Drue to repay the millions of dollars that Brooksclaimed had been stolen from Winthrop LLC. Brooks sent a series of threatening communications via letters, emails, text messages to Drue in North Carolina demanding assignment of the assets. Brooks claimed that he would institute “criminal charges, possible arrest, and public proceedings” against Drue if he did not comply.

Although Brooks’ intimidation campaign ultimately resulted in Drue conveying more than a million dollars of assets as demanded by Brooks, Brooks continued to threaten Drue. In a January 2025 letter:

Brooks threatened to involve law enforcement, have criminal charges brought, and ensure Drue’s potential arrest— presumably by local law enforcement—if Drue did not provide the requested information by 10 January 2025.

Op. ¶21.

On the demanded deadline date, Drue committed suicide. When Plaintiff Moore, as the executor of Drue’s estate, sued Brooks on a variety of theories (including intentional infliction of emotional distress), Brooks moved to dismiss on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction. Judge Houston began his jurisdictional analysis with the standard rubric from International Shoe:

a tribunal’s authority [to exercise jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment] depends on the defendant’s having such ‘contacts’ with the forum State that ‘the maintenance of the suit’ is ‘reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government,’ and ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U.S. 351, 358 (2021) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945)).

Op. ¶30.

Brooks had demanded that Drue take certain actions in North Carolina, which subjected him to jurisdiction in the State. Judge Houston held that:

a defendant who ‘kn[ows] that [the] Plaintiff resides in North Carolina’ and afterwards attempts to direct the plaintiff’s actions therein may have enough non-unilateral contacts and target the forum state sufficiently for the exercise of jurisdiction.

Op. ¶36 (relying on Shively v. Aci Learning Holdings, LLC, 2025 NCBC LEXIS 112, at *26–28 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2025).

Brooks’ threats to invoke law enforcement against Drue were also significant to the jurisdictional issue. The Court said “[i]mportantly, in making his demands of and threats against Drue, Brooks threated to involve law enforcement—it is reasonable to infer North Carolina law enforcement—and to have law enforcement charge and arrest Drue. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶132–36). With Brooks’s knowledge that Drue lived in North Carolina and with his communications focused on North Carolina, Brooks implicitly and intentionally invoked the authority of law enforcement to increase the realism and impact of his threats. . . . Op. ¶48.

Although Brooks’ threats to Drue in North Carolina were the linchpin of the Court’s ruling on personal jurisdiction, whether that conduct constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress was a closer question. “[M]ere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppression, or other trivialities” do not rise to the level of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Op. ¶61.

Moreover, a threat of “criminal prosecution” does not necessarily rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. Op.¶69.

Whether conduct is so extreme and outrageous to make out a claim for IIED is ultimately a question of fact for the jury. Here, at the pleading stage where the court must construe the factual allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

Judge Houston held that “the circumstances pleaded adequately allege a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Op. ¶72. Drue’s decision to commit suicide on the date on which Brooks demanded compliance with his demands undoubtedly contributed to the Court’s decision. See Op. ¶72.

Attorney General Strikes Blow Against Greedy Real Estate Agents

The Opinion in State ex rel. Jackson, 2026 NCBC 2 (Davis, J.) represents nearly the final chapter in a real estate scheme orchestrated by the Defendant real estate brokers over a period of years. I say “nearly” because Judge Davis left open the question of the damages be awarded against the individual defendants in the action.

The lead defendant, MV Realty PBC, LLC, conceived of a scheme whereby it would solicit residential homeowners to enter into a “Homeowner Benefit Agreement” under which the homeowner would receive a small incentive payment (between $300 and $5,000, depending on the value of the home in exchange for agreeing to use MV Realty or one of its subsidiaries as their listing agent for any future sale of their home. The term of the agreement was forty years!

The HBA imposed harsh penalties on the homeowner if he or she did not comply with it. The HBA said that MV Realty was entitled to an Early Termination Fee (the “ETF”) in the event that the homeowner used a different listing agent to sell their home. The ETF was 3% of the fair market value of the home either at the time the HBA was executed at the time the HBA was breached, whichever was greater.

The HBA further provided that the obligations of the participant constituted a covenant running with the land and would bind future successors in interest to the title of the property. Further putting the screws to the homebuyer, the HBA said that any amounts owed to MV was “secured by a security interest in lien and and against the Property as security for the amounts owed under the agreement.” Realty.

MV Realty suckered approximately 2100 North Carolina homeowners into its HBA program. Op. ¶20.

MV Realty was also active in enforcing its HBA agreements. It filed a number of lawsuits for breach of contract against North Carolina homeowners who were alleged to have violated their HBAs. In connection with those lawsuits, MV Realty filed a notice of lis pendens the Register of Deeds in the county where the property was located.

Lis pendens means “suit pending” in Latin, and serves as public notice that there is a controversy affecting the title to the property. It can impede a subsequent transaction involving the property.

The Business Court pretty much shut down MV Realty’s HBA program via an unpublishrd Preliminary Injunction entered in a previous ruling, in September 2023.

The current Opinion deals with Attorney General Jeff Jackson’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the State’s claims that the Defendants committed unfair and deceptive trade practices by:

Op. ¶39(a)-(c).

Judge Davis granted summary judgment on each of these claims. If you are interested in obscure subjects such as when a covenant runs with the land, when it is appropriate to file a lis pendens, and what constitutes an unenforceable penalty, I will refer you to paragraphs 46 through 82 of the Opinion.

AG Jackson was also successful on his motion for summary judgment as to the Defendants violation of the Telemarketing Sales Rule. The TSR, a rule promulgated by the FTC, created the “Do Not Call” Registry

In North Carolina, violations of the Telephone Solicitation Act (N.C.G.S. § 75-102), including calling numbers on the "Do Not Call" Registry or ignoring do-not-call requests, are considered unfair trade practices under NC Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. [If you are not on the Do Not Call Registry, you can place your number on it by going to www.donotcall.gov.]

The AG said it had undisputed evidence that MV Realty had initiated almost 150,000 calls to North Carolina phone numbers on the Do Not Call Registry. Op. ¶90.

MV Realty made various arguments trying to squirm out of liability for its unauthorized phone calls, including that it was not a “telephone solicitor” as defined under the North Carolina law and that its telephone calls were not “Robo calls” as proscribed by the North Carolina Telephone Solicitation Act, but Judge Davis rejected these arguments.

The damages can be substantial under the act. It provides that the violator can be liable for:

five hundrd dollars ($500.00) for the first violation, one thousand dollars ($1,000) for the second violation, and five thousand dollars ($5,000) for the third and any other violation that occurs within two years of the firste violation.

N.C. Gen. Stat. §75-105(b)(2).

Well, the lead MV Realty Defendant has filed for bankruptcy. So has its North Carolina affiliate. Op. ¶29. The North Carolina Real Estate Commission permanently revoked the real estate broker license of MV Realty of North Carolina, LLC. Op. ¶11 & fn.2.

So who is left standing to pay what may be substantial damages? It is the four former officers of the various defunct MV Realty entities. They were each actively involved in the design, implementation and control are of the HBA program.