MARCH 2026 OPINIONS (Part I)

The North Carolina Business Court is statutorily required to issue written opinions whenever it makes any order “granting a motion under G.S. sec. 1A-1, Rule 12 [motion to dismiss], 56 [motion for summary judgment], 59 [motion for new trial], or 60 [motion for relief from judgment or order].” N.C. Gen. Stat. §7A-45.3.

When I started this Newsletter, I thought it would be easier to collect the Opinions handed down by the Business Court each month and write about them all at one time tather than to write about each Opinion as it was handed down. I turned out to be wrong about that. It was really much harder than I had expected.

I've decided to continue splitting the monthly Opinions into two Newsletters. In March 2026, the Business Court issued 13 Opinions. This Newsletter covers six of them. I am still deciding how to handle the Orders of Significance.

Part II of the March 2026 Opinions will be delivered in the next few days.

The Business Court case of Watts Guerra v. Series 1 of Oxford Ins. Co. NC LLC has all the makings of a litigation blockbuster. A 326 page Complaint (with exhibits)! brought by an affiliate of a very well-regarded Texas mass torts law firm with a sparkling record of successes. Blue chip out of state law firms representing both sides. One hundred and sixteen million dollars in dispute!

Watts Guerra, the mass torts firm, had made a substantial investment in mass tort litigation cases being pursued by a New York law firm called Gacovino, Lake & Associates. Gacovino valued the cases at $340 million (the “Gacovino Book”). Watts expected a payout of $120 million from its financial backing.

You didn’t know that law firms buy or invest in mass tort claims? And that insurance companies will offer insurance against their risk? Neither did I. Apparently, it’s a multi-billion dollar industry. It's beyond me to cover it in any detail but here is a blog post from Judicial Hellholes giving a good overview of the industry as well as the insurance that is offered to protect such investments.

Undoubtedly familiar with the potential financial devastation of mass tort litigation, Watts insured against its risk. It paid $7 million to purchase twelve $10 million insurance policies from Defendant Oxford (which I will collectively refer to as the “Policy”). The insurance was intended to cover any shortfall between Watts LLC’s $120 million expected payout from the Gacovino Book and its actual return as of 15 September 2024. Op. ¶7.

When September 15th rolled around, Watts had received back only $2 million on its anticipated $120 million recovery, and prepared to file a claim for $118 million. Oxford balked at the prospect of the claim, and that led to what will certainly not be the only Opinion in this case.

For all that preamble, Judge Earp’s Opinion in Watts Guerra v. Series 1 of Oxford Ins. Co. NC LLC, 2026 NCBC 17 (Earp, J.), lands not with a bang, but instead a thump.

You haven't heard of Watts Guerra (now Guerra LLC aftter Watts and Guerra parted ways and each lawyer formed his own firm), but that may only be because they didn't have billboards on Interstate 40 every 10 miles like Morgan & Morgan, which says that it is “America's Largest Injury Firm.”

Turning back to the Watts case, the issues before Judge Earp concerned whether Watts had properly submitted its claim for $118 million. First and foremost was whether Watts had complied with Defendant Oxford's requests for information regarding the claim.

The Policies provided that defendant Oxford “HAS THE RIGHT, BUT NOT THE OBLIGATION, TO INVESTIGATE CLAIMS AGAINST AN INSURED.” Defendant Oxford requested that Watts “submit documents responsive to a series of requests for information.” Op. ¶16. Watts refused, claiming that “the requests far exceed what the Policies allow.” Id. The opinion does not specify the nature of the requests, but one thing I can say for sure is that they did not intrude into privileged information. One section of the policies specifically excluded “any information that is privileged or confidential under any applicable disciplinary rules, applicable evidentiary rules or regulations.” Op. ¶18 (quoting Policy §VI.E.1(d)).

Whatever had been requested of it, Watts took the position that the Policy required it only "to complete any claim form(s) and provide access to financial records. . . along with documentation demonstrating evidence of payment and/or loss during the claims process.” Op. ¶21.

Further bolstering its position that it was not required to respond to Defendant Oxford's unspecified requests for information, Watts contended that the insurer had anticipatorily repudiated its claim. That contention rested on Watts's allegation that representatives of Oxford (and non-Oxford employees) had told it that Oxford would refuse to pay a claim.

Pleading Anticipatory Repudiation

Under the theory of anticipatory repudiation, a promisee may immediately sue for breach when the promisor “renounces its duty under the agreement and declares its intention not to perform it[.]” Op. ¶37.

If you are contemplating bringing a claim for anticipatory repudiation, there are a few nuances to such a claim. First, the words evidencing the repudiation must be “positive, distinct, unequivocal” and constitute an “absolute refusal” to perform the contract. Op. ¶38.

Next, the party bringing the claim must have treated the anticipatory repudiation as such. In other words, “a breach of contract based on anticipatory repudiation ‘depends not only upon the statements and actions of the allegedly repudiating party but also upon the response of the non-repudiating party.’” Op. 38.

Also, only the statements attributable to the parties themselves, not those of third parties, are relevant to the claimed repudiation.. Op. ¶39. That last nuance diminished the force of Watts’claim since some of the statements regarding Oxford’s alleged intention not to honor Watts's claim were made by third parties who were involved in some of the negotiations over a possible purchase of the Giacovino book.

But what ultimately doomed Watts’ claim it was excused from providing the information requested by Oxford because of its alleged anticipatory repudiation of the Policy was Watts's failure to treat Oxford conduct as an anticipatory repudiation. It filed a new claim under the Policy (this time for ”only” $116 million) after the statements of Oxford’s alleged intention not to pay. Watts also alleged in its complaint that it had “continued to engage with Oxford in good faith after the statements of repudiation. Op ¶41.

As Judge Earp put it “Watts LLC’s failure to treat Oxford’s alleged statements and conduct as a breach defeats its theory that actionable repudiation occurred.” Op. ¶42.

Condition Precedent

As she marched toward the ultimate dismissal (without prejudice) of Plaintiff's claim for breach of contract, Judge Earp first had to determine whether the provision of the requested information to the defendant insurer was a condition precedent to the bringing of the lawsuit.

The Policy said that the insured had no right to sue Oxford unless it had complied with all the terms of the Policy. That question then turned on whether Watts had complied with the Policy provisions regarding its obligation to provide Oxford with information in the claims process.

Watts and Oxford disagreed on the meaning of the Policy in that regard. Rejecting the assertion that the policy provision was ambiguous, Judge Earp said that “the fact that the parties disagree about the meaning of a policy provision is not enough. . . . Whether an ambiguity exists is a question for the Court.” Op. ¶47.

The precise language in question was ““following receipt of the completed Notice of Claim and approved claim form(s) referenced in Section VI.E.1.b, along with the documentation described in Section VI.E.1.b and all other information requested by Oxford [sic].” Op. ¶50 (quoting Policy § VI.F.1)(emphasis added).

This is a point where I find amusement in this case. Watts argued that the ‘all other information” language was “carefully tailored to specific documents like the claims forms and statements of loss” referred to elsewhere in the policy. Oxford took the position that the provision should be read broadly to encompass any information it requests.” Op. ¶50.

The amusing part? Ejusdem generis. What? Watts’ lawyers argued that “the principle of ejusdem generis applies when construing the language of the Policies.” It argued “that ejusdem generis is ‘settled law’ for interpreting insurance contracts in North Carolina.” Op. ¶51 (emphasis added). It is pretty funny to see out-of-state counsel presenting something as “settled law” in North Carolina to a North Carolina Judge when it isn't settled law at all. Judge Earp observed that the North Carolina Supreme Court has never endorsed the use of the principle in interpreting insurance contracts. Op. ¶51. Never heard of the supposedly settled law of ejusdem generis in North Carolina? Neither had I. Here is the definition of the term.

After stepping through a contractual analysis using standard principles of contract interpretation (and not ejusdem generis), Judge Earp determined that Oxford was entitled to the information had requested and that Watts had failed to satisfy the condition precedent to bring a lawsuit. She accordingly dismissed Watts's claim for breach of contract without prejudice. Op. ¶64.

Bad Faith Claims

The Business Court let stand Watts’ claim that Oxford had engaged in bad faith and unfair and deceptive trade practices. (Remember that this is a decision at the Motion to Dismiss stage and not a summary judgment case).

On the bad faith claim, Watts was claiming that Oxford intended to delay the processing of its claim in order to make its balance sheet more attractive to a prospective purchaser of Oxford's parent company. The parent company (Accession) was in fact subsequently acquired by an insurance brokerage firm. Op. ¶27.

Well, how can Watts proceed with a bad faith claim if its breach of contract claim has been dismissed? As Judge Earp noted “our Court of Appeals [has] held that, while alleging breach of contract alone was insufficient to support a bad faith claim, it was not necessary for a breach of contract claim to exist in order for a bad faith claim to exist.” Op. ¶68 (citing Robinson v. N.C. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 86 N.C. App. 44, 49–50 (1987)).

And how substantial could Watts’ damages be for the bad faith delay of its claim? Well, I’m sure that these mass tort lawyers can conjure up something significant beyond pain and suffering.

The Business Court does not have mandatory jurisdiction over a plain-vanilla covenant not to compete case. That’s been settled since 2008, when I designated such a case to the Business Court and I had my ears boxed by OG Business Court Judge Tennille. He said, in “undesignating” the case, that:

every suit based upon a breach of a restrictive covenant or breach of a Confidentiality Agreement [will not] give rise to a mandatory business case based upon ‘unfair competition.’

(unpublished) Order in Workplace Benefits, LLC v. Lifecare, Inc. (decided before the Court began issuing “Orders of Significance.”). I wrote about my mea culpa seventeen years ago here.

Since then, it is routine for a covenant not to compete case designated to the Business Court to included an accompanying claim for trade secret misappropriation in order to fit within the mandatory designation guidelines (N.C.G.S. §7A-45.1(8) provides the Court with mandatory jurisdiction over “[d]isputes involving trade secrets”).

This is true of Jekson USA, Inc. v. White, 2026 NCBC 18 (Davis, J.), which paired a claim for breaching a covenant not to compete and a confidentiality provision with a trade secret misappropriation claim.

Defendant White, while working for the Plaintiff, had developed a “mechanical design, feeding assembly, and performance specifications” for a proprietary ammunition tray loading and inspection system. The system was designed to “automatically orient and load 9mm rounds tip-down into 5x10 (50 count) plastic trays, inspect each round for primer defects using a vision system, and reject trays with defective rounds—all while Op. achieving a high throughput rate.” Op. ¶6.

This new system dovetailed with plaintiff’s principal business, which was “working with customers in regulated fields such as the pharmaceutical and biopharma industries, and provides those customers with ‘proprietary automated systems, custom equipment and other proprietary solutions for inspecting products, tracking them through the supply chain, and moving them efficiently during manufacturing.’” Op.¶3.

The Plaintiff asserts that before leaving its employment, he Defendant “took a physical rendering of the tray loading design from Jekson’s facility to a 3D scanning vendor so that he could copy the design.” Op. ¶7.

The defendant then began a competing business, leading to plaintiff’s lawsuit for breach of the restrictions in his employment contract (The non-competition restriction and the confidentiality provision) and his misappropriation of trade secrets.

Consideration for the Restrictions

Defendant argued that he had not received consideration for the noncompetition provision since the Employment Agreement in which it was contained was not executed until 14 days after he began working for the Plaintiff.

Judge Davis agreed to some extent. He said “It is true that new consideration is necessary to make a non-competition agreement enforceable when it is signed after employment has begun.” Op.¶32.

He noted, however, that “our courts have held that no new consideration is required where the parties agreed to the non-competition restriction at the time the employment relationship started, even though the agreement was not reduced to writing until later. Op. ¶33 (citing Battleground Veterinary Hosp., P.C. v. McGeough, 2007 NCBC LEXIS 33, at *15 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 19, 2007) (“It is immaterial that the written contract is executed after the employee starts to work, so long as the terms incorporated therein were agreed upon at the time of employment.”)).

It was Plaintiff’s position that the parties agreed to the Non-Compete at the time Defendant’s employment first began—even though it was not reduced to writing until two weeks later. Op. ¶35.

Judge Davis ruled that it would be premature, at the Motion to Dismiss stage, to resolve the disputed issue of whether the non-compete had been agreed to at the outset of Defendants employment. He held that the plaintiff would need to prove its assertion that the restriction had been agreed to at the outset of employment at a later stage of the litigation. Op. ¶35.

There was no similar factual issue (of consideration) on the validity of the confidentiality provision, Even though it was also contained in the employment agreement that the defendant executed 14 days after beginning employment. Judge Davis observed that “this Court has held that “a confidentiality agreement need not be supported by additional consideration if the agreement does not constitute a restraint of trade.” See Amerigas Propane, L.P. v. Coffey, 2015 NCBC LEXIS 98, at *38 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct.. 15, 2015).” Op. ¶36.

Other Non-Compete Issues

Defendant White also argued that the non-compete had expired since the Employment Agreement only provided for a three year term of employment. In other words, he took the position that the noncompete would expire once he had worked for the Plaintiff for those three years.

Judge Davis rejected this argument as well. He drew this conclusion from the plain language of the Employment Agreement, stating that the noncompetition provisions of the agreement were prefaced with the phrase“[d]uring the time of his employment by the Company, and for a period of One (1) year thereafter, the Employee’s termination[.]” Op. ¶40. He said that the noncompetition provision would presumably have remained in effect for a year after the defendant’s resignation on 21 September 2024. Op. ¶40.

Resignation vs. Termination

There was also an issue raised by the Defendant about whether the noncompete was triggered because he had resigned from the Plaintiff as opposed to being terminated by the Plaintiff. White contended that the prefatory language of the noncompetition agreement did not apply to his voluntary resignation from the company. The applicable language said that “[d]uring the time of his employment by the Company, and for a period of One (1) year thereafter the Employee’s termination for any reason[.]” Defendant White took the position that he had not been terminated by the company, but that he had voluntarily resigned.

Judge Davis also ruled that this is an issue that could not be resolved at the motion to dismiss stage. He relied upon two Court of Appeals decisions which had addressed the same argument based on similar language in holding that “such an ambiguity could not be resolved at the pleadings stage.” Op. ¶42. Those two cases are Battleground Veterinary Hosp., P.C. v. McGeough, 2007 NCBC LEXIS 33, at *136 (finding contract language regarding “termination of employment” ambiguous and that its interpretation was properly a question of fact for a jury); and Novacare Orthotics & Prosthetics E., Inc. v. Speelman, 137 N.C. App. 471, 476 (2000)(“From the language alone, we cannot say that, as a matter of law, the covenant against competition was triggered when defendant resigned from his employment.”) Id.

So this case will remain pending in the Business Court until those factual issues are resolved.,

In Londry v. Stream Realty Partners, L.P., 2026 NCBC 19, Business Court Judge Earp took the unusual step of reconsidering her prior opinion in the case, Londry v. Stream Realty Partners, L.P., 2025 NCBC 31. For a thorough and well-written discussion of the previous opinion (written by a former Business Court clerk) click here.

In the first ruling, Judge Earp had denied the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's claim that the Defendant had breached its obligations to him as a partner of the Defendant. Judge Earp had ruled in that first decision that due to “the mix of evidence presented,” it could not conclude as a matter of law whether Plaintiff Londry and individual Defendant Farrar, a partner of the Defendant partnership (Stream Realty Partners-Charlotte, L,P.) had reached an enforceable partnership agreement.

Inexplicably, neither party had presented a copy of the written partnership agreement forming Stream Realty Partners-Charlotte, L. P. in connection with the first ruling.

In this second go-round asking for reconsideration of the first ruling, the defendant partnership presented the written agreement and argued that it did not vest Farrar with the authority to convey a partnership interest to the Plaintiff and that Plaintiff therefore could not have become a partner on the basis of an oral promise from Farrar.

Plaintiff objected to the Motion for Reconsideration on the basis that the Partnership Agreement was not newly discovered evidence and that it had always been available to the Defendants. It said that it was “‘improper to use [the Motion] to “ask the Court to rethink what the Court has already thought through—rightly or wrongly.’ ” Op. ¶13.

Judge Earp agreed with the Plaintiff on this point, saying that “The Partnership Agreement was indisputably available to Defendants and could have been presented with their Motion for Summary Judgment.” Op. ¶14.

The Court then took a different route in granting the Motion for Reconsideration. Judge Earp said:

In reaching its decision, however, the Court placed the burden of producing the Partnership Agreement on Defendants, the moving party, rather than on Londry. On further reflection, that was incorrect.

Op. ¶19 (emphasis added).

Rule 60 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to reconsider an interlocutory ruling if "the prior decision was based on clear error or would work manifest injustice.” Op. ¶10.

Judge Earp stated that Plaintiff Londry had failed to present evidence showing that Farrar had the authority as a minority partner to single-handedly make Londry a partner in the partnership. Therefore, she backed off her prior ruling that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether plaintiff had partnership status and granted summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims of breach of the partnership agreement and his claim for breach of fiduciary duty based on his alleged status as a partner.

It's pretty rare for the Business Court to grant a Motion for Reconsideration. It is probably even more rare for any judge to admit that he or she had made a mistake in a ruling. Kudos to Judge Earp for reconsidering her prior decision.

Judge Houston’s Opinion in Ordonez Cordero v. Ordonez Cordero, 2026 NCBC 20 (Houston, J.) was a dream for me to write about. Not because of the significance of the opinion, but because it is only three pages and nine paragraphs long!

This case is a reminder that the Business Court Rules mean what they say. The Rule at issue here is BCR 7.2, which reads as follows:

7.2. Form of motion and brief; scope of motion hearing. Each motion must be filed as a separate document. Unless listed in BCR 7.10, a motion must be accompanied by a brief. The Court has discretion to deny the motion summarily if a required brief is not filed.

The Defendant had included a Motion to Dismiss in its answer to the Complaint. Judge Houston refer to it as “perfunctory” and quoted it as as follows:

Under North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A claim should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) when there is a want of law to support a claim of the sort made, an absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim, or the disclosure of some fact which will necessarily defeat the claim. E.g., Garvin v. Fayetteville, 102 N.C. App. 121, 123 (1991) (citing Orange County v. North Carolina Dep’t of Transportation, 46 N.C. App. 350, 379 (1980)).

Op. ¶3.

Given that the Motion was not filed as a "separate" document and that the Defendant had not filed a separate brief addressing the motion, Judge Houston denied the Motion to Dismiss. He did not say whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice, however, so the Defendant may still have an opportunity to properly file a Motion to Dismiss.

The Assurance Group v, Shackelford, 2026 NCBC 23 (Davis, J.) marks the second Opinion in the case this year. In the prior ruling, which I wrote about here, Judge Davis ruled that a familial relationship between a nephew and his uncle was insufficient to create a fiduciary relationship.

The case is about the defendant, a former insurance agent for the plaintiff, entering into competition with the plaintiff

This time, Judge Davis first confronted a Motion to Strike by the Defendant. Plaintiff had attempted to incorporate by reference in its Complaint allegations from the Complaint in another lawsuit. The other lawsuit involved a different group of former insurance agents of the Plaintiff bringing claims against Plaintiff The Assurance Group (“TAG”). In particular, this Complaint incorporated by reference paragraphs 1 through 87 of that related Complaint.

Is that a bad thing? I wouldn’t have blinked twice at it or considered it as fodder for a Motion to Strike. Neither did Judge Davis, relying on a North Carolina Supreme Court decision in Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181 (1979), which denied a Motion to Dismiss based on similar grounds. The basis for the Supreme Court decision was that the incorporated by reference complaint had been attached to the complaint incorporating it as an exhibit. N.C. R. Civ. P. 10(c) provides in part, “[a] copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.” (Emphasis added.). The attached complaint was therefore not a "matter outside the pleadings

Tortious Interference with Contract Claim: Intended and Incidental Beneficiaries.

In a Counterclaim, the insurance broker Defendant was seeking damages against the Plaintiff for allegedly inducing its policyholders to change their agent/broker of record from Defendant to Plaintiff TAG.

This would result in the Defendant losing the renewal commissions from the original sale of the policies. (I know from my limited knowledge of the insurance business that renewal commissions are the bread-and-butter of insurance agents ). The theory underlying this claim was that the defendant was an intended beneficiary of the insurance contract and that the Plaintiffs’ conduct had tortiously interfered with their expected renewal commissions.

Judge Davis distinguished intended beneficiaries of a contract and incidental beneficiaries of a contract. A party seeking to make a claim for tortious interference with contract must show that "the contract was entered into for his direct, and not incidental, benefit. Op. ¶45.

”He ruled that: “it would be illogical to suggest that a primary intent of the parties to those insurance contracts was to ensure that Defendants received a commission.”

The tortious interference claim was therefore dismissed. Op. ¶48

Defamation Claims Also Dismissed

The Defendants, in another counterclaim, contended that TAG’s agents had made disparaging comments about them to policyholders and that the plaintiffs were therefore liable under a theory of slander per se.

Slander per se is:

an oral communication to a third party which amounts to (1) an accusation that the plaintiff committed a crime involving moral turpitude; (2) an allegation that impeaches the plaintiff in his trade, business, or profession; or (3) an imputation that the plaintiff has a loathsome disease.

Op. ¶ 51. Claims for defamation are subject to a heightened pleading standard of specificity. Op. ¶52. How specific? Judge Davis said that:

“The claimant must recite the defamatory statement verbatim or with sufficient particularity to enable the court to determine whether the statement was defamatory.” Id. (cleaned up). In addition, the claimant “must state the time and place of the alleged defamatory communication.

Op. ¶52 (citing Addison Whitney, LLC v. Cashion, 2017 NCBC LEXIS 111, at *15 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 2017).

Here, the defamation claim was very skimpy on specificity. It merely referenced statements that “impeached the claimant in its trade, business, or profession.” The supposedly defamatory statements were that the agents who had sold the policies ‘were “no longer working” as insurance agents and/or had left the industry and/or the area under clouded circumstances.’

Op. ¶54.

In addition to the lack of specificity, Judge Davis also dismissed the slander claim because:

the nature of the alleged statements fails to meet the threshold established under our case law for impeaching one in his or her profession for purposes of a slander per se claim.

Op. ¶ 56 (citing Stutts v. Duke Power Co., 47 N.C. App. 76, 82 (1980)).

Claim for Breach of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act

The lawsuit also included a third party complaint brought by the former agents of TAG against Edward Shackelford for a breach of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act.

The Wage and Hour Act provides that an employee can recover unpaid wages from an "employer.” This claim was leveled against individual Defendant Shackelford. The Act defines an “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §95-25.2(5).

Shackelford claimed that he was not a proper defendant to this claim. Judge Davis noted that although the allegations against Shackelford were “bare-bones”(they were little more than that “Third-Party Defendant Ed Shackelford . . . was the individual who made the decision not to pay any amounts to Third-Party Plaintiffs after they resigned”) they could not be resolved at the Motion to dismiss stage

JKH Capital, LLC v. Tanglewood Owners, LLC, 2026 NCBC 22 (Conrad, J.) is a case about personal jurisdiction. Whether a particular defendant has sufficient minimum contacts to be subjected to jurisdiction in North Carolina is always particularly fact specific. I am not interested in writing about that kind of case, but if you are interested in the particular facts of this one you are welcome to read the case.

My personal view of Rule 12(b)(2) motions is that they are a lose-lose proposition. If the client is successful in having the case dismissed, it has just delayed the inevitable. If the claims are serious it will then just be sued in another jurisdiction. If the client is unsuccessful, it will have wasted the time of the Court and the attorneys fees it incurred. And I don't know why a lawyer or his client would think that they could find a better state trial court than the North Carolina Business Court.

I am not saying that the Business Court’s Opinions on personal jurisdiction matters are never worth writing about. I have written previously about several of them. For example, there were: (1) a case on whether Internet advertising was a sufficient basis for subjecting a defendant to personal jurisdiction in North Carolina, (2) a case whether a designation to the Business Court is a general appearance for jurisdictional purposes. (Covenant Equipment Corp. v. Forklift Pro, Inc., 2008 NCBC 10 (Tennille, J.), and (3) a case whether personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation (in that case, a Japanese corporation) included the power to subpoena a corporate officer to appear to testify in the United States (Jolly, J.)(It did). If you want to read more in depth about any of those cases, you can find my discussion of them on my discontinued blog, The North Carolina Business Litigation Report by searching that site for “personal jurisdiction.”